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Abstract 
Greater London, among many large cities, was subject to bombing by the German military in 
both the World Wars and was the target of many air raids during the Second World War 
(WW2).  This was particularly the case during the Blitz, September 1940 – May 1941, when 
over 28,000 high explosive bombs and parachute mines were dropped on London.  Post war 
research conducted in 1949 estimated that approximately 12,750t of bombs, including V1 and 
V2 rockets, were dropped on London.  The night of 16th –17th April 1941 was one of the worst 
bombing raids, when 446t of bombs were dropped on London and over 58t did not detonate.  
Unexploded bombs remain buried underground today, as they were unidentified at the time or 
abandoned owing to difficulties in recovering them. Uncharted bombs continue to pose a 
potentially significant hazard for developments around London.  This paper considers the 
probability of discovering unexploded ordnance (UXO), particularly WW2 ordnance, during 
intrusive groundworks in London.  The prevalence of unexploded ordnance has been 
assessed using data obtained from governmental organisations to estimate the likelihood of 
discovery in London.   
 
Introduction  
The Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA) published guidance 
on the management of risks associated with unexploded ordnance (Stone et al., 2009).  The 
principal purpose of the guide, supported by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), was 
to “provide the UK construction industry with a set and defined process for the management 
of risks associated with UXO from WW1 and WW2 aerial bombardment”.   
The geographical area considered within this paper has been limited to Greater London 
(defined in Figure 1) which suffered considerable bomb damage during WW2.  This area has 
since undergone widespread redevelopment and historical information on the discovery of 
UXO is widely available from public bodies.  The CIRIA guide (2009) reports that “unexploded 
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ordnance resulting from aerial bombardment continues to be encountered [in] … London in 
particular, especially during construction and redevelopment works.” 
The term ‘UXO’ defined by CIRIA (2009), refers to any type of unexploded ordnance, whilst 
‘UXB’ specifically refers to unexploded bombs, which are usually delivered aerially.  The risks 
associated UXO and UXB vary and once encountered should be dealt with accordingly.   
The CIRIA guide (2009) describes the most common types of ordnance that pose a significant 
UXO risk.  Aerial delivered high explosives (HE) were designed with relatively thick walls, 
therefore would usually withstand impact with the ground.  Instead of detonating, the UXO 
could penetrate the ground and become embedded at depth.  This outcome is less likely for 
other aerial ordnance owing to their thin wall construction.  Unexploded WW2 anti-aircraft 
artillery shells from ‘friendly forces’ are commonly discovered but they are unlikely to be found 
at depth and contain much less explosive than HE bombs.  Therefore, the detonation of 
concealed HE bombs pose a critical hazard to contractors working below ground level.   
Background for research 
Over the last 10 years it has become common practice for piling contractors to request 
evidence that a site is clear of UXO.  In the past, clients rarely undertook a risk assessment, 
hence the responsibility in providing this was subsequently passed onto the main contractor.  
Less diligent contractors ignore the risk and merely assume that UXO will not be encountered, 
thus providing a more competitive tender.  More recently, planning permission notices have 
specified a requirement to detail the UXO risk mitigation measures that will be in place.   
A preliminary risk assessment conducted by a specialist company will usually recommend 
completing a detailed risk assessment.   This second desk study usually identifies a 
low/medium risk of UXO and will almost always recommends an intrusive survey across part 
of the site to locate potential UXO.  These surveys do not commonly reveal any UXO.  Lang 
et al (2015) challenged the reputation of the UXO industry and noted that “developers are 
seeking a second opinion on… UXO risk assessments due to the apparent disparity between 
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the evidence presented in the reports and the often extensive risk mitigation recommended… 
by some UXO specialists, which on the surface seem only to be dedicated to increasing their 
sales”. 
Risk assessment process 
The Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, requires steps to be taken to reduce risks so far as 
is reasonably practicable, which means “balancing the level of risk against the measures 
needed to control the real risk… [and]…it is not necessary to take action if it would be grossly 
disproportionate to the level of risk.”   
A large HE bomb exploding has the potential to kill numerous people, however the likelihood 
of this event maybe very low.   
Whilst attempting to develop a realistic UXO assessment process for the Crossrail works, it 
was quickly realised that the simplistic concept of ‘risk = probability multiplied by consequence’ 
would not work in a “practical and meaningful way”, owing to the high potential for a UXO to 
cause harm (Smith et al., 2014).  
CIRIA (2009) suggested a four stage assessment approach: 
 Stage 1.  A preliminary risk assessment, which can be performed by a non-UXO 
specialist, suggesting that most sites are anticipated “as having a low probability of a 
UXO hazard”.   
 Stage 2.  Detailed risk assessment estimating the “likelihood of creating a UXO 
hazard”, completed by UXO specialists. 
 Stage 3.  Risk mitigation to ‘eliminate risk or reduce to an acceptable level’, which 
should ensure that “an efficient and cost-effective risk mitigation programme is 
selected”. 
 Stage 4.  Implement risk mitigation plan. 
The probability of encountering UXO 
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The CIRIA guide (2009) states that “there is no available data regarding the number of UXO 
incidents on construction sites within the UK” and “it is estimated that about 15,000 items of 
ordnance ranging from high explosive … bombs to smaller items such as mortar rounds and 
grenades … have been removed from UK construction sites” between 2006 to 2008 but 
“estimated that about five per cent were live”.  This information was provided by two of the 
UK’s largest, but unnamed, UXO specialist companies and the figure would be higher if data 
was collected from a wider pool.  This implies that more than 250 substantial items of live 
ordnance are discovered annually on construction sites.  Anecdotal evidence from UXO 
contractors suggests that the probability of discovering UXO on construction sites remains 
high. 
Local Authorities kept records of the location and type of bombs that were dropped during 
WW2 as part of the government’s Air Raid Precaution requirements.  Some were detailed and 
accurate, although errors occurred when numerous bombs were dropped and safety was the 
primary concern over record keeping.   
Post raid surveys were carried out by the emergency services staff to identify UXO as reported 
in the CIRIA guide (2009).  Confirmed or suspected UXBs were reported in the Bomb Census 
and the rate of HE bombs that failed to detonate is accepted by the industry to be 
approximately 10%, which reflects estimate of the Home Office’s Chief Scientific Adviser 
(Hunt, 1949). 
Unfortunately, this failure rate is sometimes misinterpreted and it is suggested all UXB still 
exist.  In 2007, the BBC quoted a risk assessment that suggested “of 1,493 high explosive 
bombs [that were dropped on the Olympics site during WW2], 207 remain unexploded”.  
Following WW2, the British estimate of the tonnage of German bombs dropped was compared 
with German military sources.  The 16th-17th April 1941 raid described by Hunt (1949) 
estimated 446t of HE bombs were dropped.  However, German sources suggested 890t HE 
bombs and a further 151t of incendiary bombs were dropped.  If the British consistently 
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underestimated the tonnage of bombs dropped, but accurately counted the UXB, then the 
actual failure rate would have been overestimated. 
These figures have little relevance today as the danger posed by UXO was generally well 
understood during the war and known UXO were identified and cleared by bomb disposal 
units.  It is worth noting that ordnance, if present, is likely to be found in made ground, river 
terrace gravels or the upper levels of London Clay.   
A number of UXBs were abandoned during the war owing to limited resources required to 
clear them, higher priorities elsewhere or their location.  Following the war however, significant 
efforts were made to investigate and remove them.  By June 1946, 99 bombs that had been 
approved for abandonment in London; of these 62 were “virtually discredited”, “not proven” or 
“yielded no trace”, i.e. probably never existed.  There was “tangible evidence” for the remaining 
37, however these were “all in positions which, having regard to their estimated size and depth, 
constitute no danger to the public”. Twelve bombs weighed 50kg or less and were located in 
cemeteries.  “The rest are mostly estimated at 50kg and deep in water-logged soil in marshes, 
banks of rivers, or reservoirs, sewage farms, refuse pits…” (McIvor, 1946).  A report to 
Parliament stated that 89 abandoned bombs remained in London at 74 sites (Hansard, 1996). 
The UXBs that escaped notice at the time of landing are now the primary hazard.  As they 
were not identified it is essential that risk assessments are undertaken to assess the likelihood 
of it encountering them. 
Copping (2008) reported 21,000 potential locations in Great Britain of UXBs.  As bombs were 
dropped in sequence it was claimed that their location could be determined by identifying 
demolished buildings and give a very good indication of whether “there is a bomb in the 
vicinity".  Jones et al. (2013) estimated that during the Blitz 28,000 bombs were dropped on 
London, therefore the 21,000 UXBs remaining in Great Britain appears surprisingly high.  This 
statistic may have ignored the UXBs that were identified and removed during and immediately 
after WW2.   
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Review of sample risk assessments 
A sample risk assessment presented in the CIRIA guide (2009) makes an assumption on this 
probability of encountering UXBs and is indicative of the difficulty experienced in making an 
objective assessment.  Figure 2 is a reproduction of a map showing the locations of bombs 
identified during WW2.  The sample risk assessment states that “there are records of several 
bombs falling on the site itself.  There is credible evidence indicating a high risk of potential 
UXB being present on the site”, however the relationship between past bombing and the 
presence of UXB is not explained nor is ‘high risk’ defined.  
The sample report suggested that the density of UXBs remaining in Rotherhithe, London was 
either one, two or three 50kg bombs per hectare.  There is however no justification for these 
values, except to advise that it is prudent to assume that there is at least one UXB/Ha.  The 
density of remaining UXBs greater than 50kg is not postulated.  London County Council (LCC) 
bomb damage maps (Saunders, 2005), referenced in this particular risk assessment, suggests 
that between 200 and 300 bombs were dropped for every 1000 acres in Greenwich, London 
which equates to 0.49 – 0.74 bombs per hectare.  On the basis that approximately 90% of 
these bombs exploded, the assumption that 1 UXB/Ha remains appears to be implausibly high 
without additional justification. 
The assessment of a Paddington site states that 151 HE bombs were dropped over 100Ha.  
The typical maximum failure rate for UXO was assumed as 15% and the factors influencing 
the probability of discovery were listed.  This assessment made a subjective estimate that it 
was 30% likely that UXO were not detected during WW2.  This resulted in a residual UXB 
density of 0.07 UXB/Ha, which equates to a probability of 14%, given the size of the site.  The 
probability of encountering UXO is then reduced to 0.94%, as excavation is limited.  This is 
defined as a ‘moderate probability’ and that “if UXO is found, the likelihood of initiating the 
device and causing an explosion is substantially lower”.  The report suggests that in such 
instances, an Explosives Safety Supervisor is not justified and that an ordnance briefing is 
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sufficient for site personnel.  Therefore, a moderate probability can be considered as an 
acceptable and manageable risk. 
The LCC bomb damage maps state a bombing density of between 200 and 300 bombs per 
1000 acres for this area, which equates to 0.49 – 0.74 bombs/Ha.  Adopting the upper figure, 
combining it with a 10% failure rate (CIRIA, 2009) and an assumed non-detection rate of 10% 
reduces the residual UXB density to 0.0074 UXB/Ha.  This is equivalent to one UXB per 
135Ha; an order of magnitude lower than the second risk assessment.    
The potential residual UXO density ranges from three 50kg HE bombs per hectare, to one 
UXB per 135Ha, demonstrating the degree of subjectivity that exists when completing risk 
assessments. 
Literature sources 
The observations presented in this paper provide additional data in an attempt to quantify the 
probability of encountering UXO and UXBs on construction sites in London over a twelve-year 
period.  The five sources of information are as follows: 
 Freedom of information (FoI) requests made to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
 FoI requests made to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)  
 FoI requests made to the London Fire Brigade (LFB) 
 FoI requests made to various London Boroughs 
 FoI requests made to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
The MPS are responsible for coordinating suspected UXO incidents, have explosive ordnance 
disposal teams and can be expected to have information regarding the location of every UXO 
discovery.  The LFB would attend if there was a risk of fire in the event of detonation.  Local 
authorities may record the incident if it was brought to their attention or to provide temporary 
shelter for displaced residents.   
Ministry of Defence 
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The MoD estimated a total of 424 WW2 air dropped weapons were made safe between 2010 
and 2016 across the UK by the Army; 34 of these were German HE bombs, whilst 316 were 
1 or 2 kg German incendiaries.  Within London, there were seven German HE or large 
incendiary devices discoveries between 2004 – 2016, averaging 0.54 UXBs per year.   
Metropolitan Police Service records 
The Metropolitan Police deal with explosive ordnance incidents within the Greater London 
area.  From 2004 – 2007 and 2009 – 2014 the MPS attended 1533 incidents involving ‘live 
ordnance’, requiring assistance from their explosive ordnance disposal teams.  The scale of 
these incidents could range from a firework to a terrorist attack and the types of ordnance 
were not specified, so may not have originated from the war.  560 of these incidents were 
analysed to identify if they were on construction sites.  An initial review showed that 5 of the 
560 incidents were thought to have occurred on construction sites, however further analysis 
revealed that one incident did not involve ordnance.  If these results are representative, then 
simple extrapolation suggests that about 12 UXO discoveries on construction sites were 
sampled over the 10-year period.   
In 2015 there were three well publicised UXB discoveries in London.  The MPS analysed all 
105 live ordnance incidents that they attended in 2015 and revealing that three occurred on 
construction sites.  This provides reassurance about the general quality of their analysis.  If 
the results of all these years are combined, this would suggest an average of 1.4 incidents 
each year over the 11-year assessment period. 
London Fire Brigade records 
The LFB press release (2015) stated that since 2009 they had attended to nine WW2 UXBs.  
A freedom of information request revealed further details about the UXBs and were cross-
referenced to contemporaneous reports from the Internet.  Of the nine events, there was 
independent corroboration of UXO for two incidents.  References could not be found for four 
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of the incidents and three were reported by the media as non-ordnance items, such as a light 
fitting or a piece of metal.   
Omitting the three incorrectly reported occurrences leaves a revised figure of six possible UXB 
incidents.  The LFB described one uncorroborated incident as involving an incendiary device 
as opposed to a HE.  At another incident the Police removed an item 30 minutes after arriving 
on site, which suggests that it was not an air dropped HE UXB.   
Corroborating evidence could reasonably be expected given the involvement of other 
authorities and the significant media interest in these events.  For the same period, the Army 
only dealt with 2 UXBs, so it would be unlikely that the LFB dealt with 6 UXBs.  As such, it has 
been assumed that the 4 unconfirmed events were UXO and not UXBs.  Therefore, across 80 
months the rate of discovery was on average 0.15 UXBs each year, but this figure is not limited 
to construction sites.   
London Boroughs 
Freedom of Information requests were made to the London boroughs and the City of London 
for the number of WW2 UXBs located in their borough between 2004 – 2015.  The quality and 
level of detail of the data varied, however 17 responses were received representing over half 
of the 33 London boroughs.  On average there were 3.1 incidents each year, which included 
all types of WW2 ordnance, such as: British anti-aircraft artillery shells, grenades, war-time 
trophies and UXO dredged from the sea for aggregate.  Assuming this figure was 
representative of all the London boroughs, the average number of UXO discoveries equates 
to 6 items of UXO/year across London, but not limited to construction sites. 
Summary of incidents 
Table 1 summarises all the known incidents.  It should be noted that the location of a small 
number of UXO incidents is unknown and in these cases it was assumed that they were not 
on construction sites.  
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Ten UXBs were discovered in the 12-year period, averaging 0.83/year.  On construction sites 
in London this average increases to 1.7 incidents/year involving any type of live ordnance 
each year.   
It is reasonable to assume that the period during and immediately following WW2 posed the 
highest UXO risk when undertaking clearance or construction work in London.  The discovery 
and progressive removal of UXO has steadily been conducted since.  In addition, much of 
London was rebuilt following the war and some has since been redeveloped.  Considering 
these factors, the probability of discovering UXO is gradually diminishing.  However, the 
annual rate of discovery rate may also be influenced by the economic state of the country; a 
rise in construction projects may lead to more ordnance encounters.   
Comparison of UXO discovery rate, by source  
For the time period 2004 – 2015: 
 data from the Army suggests 0.5 UXB/year at any location (omitting 2016 figures);  
 LFB reports suggest an average of 0.15 UXB/year at any location; 
 figures from the London Boroughs suggest an average of 6 UXO incidents/year at any 
location; 
 MPS figures suggest an average of 1.4 incidents/year on construction sites, involving 
any sort of ‘live ordnance’;  
 The consolidated analysis suggests an average of 1.7 UXO incidents a year on 
construction sites and an average of 0.83 UXB/year, at any location. 
These figures broadly correlate and there is a notable difference between the estimate in the 
CIRIA guide (2009) who suggest that significantly more than 250 live UXO items are 
discovered annually on construction sites in the UK.  It is likely that ordnance in London was 
cleared by UXO companies, however CIRIA (2009) state that “where high risk UXO is 
discovered (eg German WW2 aerial delivered iron bombs) the appropriate military bomb 
disposal unit will be required to deal with it”.  In addition, the UXO discovery evacuation plan 
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suggested in the CIRIA guide (2002) specifies contacting the police if suspected ordnance is 
discovered.  It is possible that this discrepancy occurs because significant quantities of 
ordnance are found in single incidents or clustered in small high risk areas, such as former 
military sites or factories outside London, during redevelopment. 
Likelihood of discovery 
Under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (2015), there is a legal 
obligation to submit a F10 form to the HSE if the duration of a project or the number of people 
working on it is expected to exceed a set threshold.  CDM Regulations were first introduced 
in 1994 and this requirement has existed since that time thus providing a good indication of 
the number of construction sites that were established.  Whilst it is accepted that some of 
these projects do not penetrate the ground, other non-notifiable projects (such as many 
domestic extensions) may involve ground works.  The HSE provided details on the number of 
F10 forms that were submitted over the 12-year period in question to quantify the probability 
of discovering ordnance on a construction site.  There was at least one instance (albeit not in 
London) where an aerial delivered UXO was discovered in the wall of a building; there is the 
potential for this to occur elsewhere.   
Between 2004 and 2015 almost 141,000 F10 forms were submitted for London based sites.  
On the basis that an average of 1.7 ‘live’ UXO incidents were reported on construction sites 
each year, there could have been as many as 21 incidents over the 12-year period requiring 
assistance from statutory authorities.  This would suggest that UXO of any type are discovered 
on average every 6,700 sites.  It is not possible to accurately assess the number of UXBs that 
were found on construction sites with the information available.  If it was assumed that all 10 
UXBs were found on construction sites, this would suggest that one UXB is discovered for 
every 14,000 sites which require F10 notification.  However, eight UXB discoveries is probably 
correct; the two omissions were found at a quarry and during road resurfacing, which would 
result in one UXB discovery for every 17, 600 sites. 
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Risk of detonation 
The CIRIA guide (2009) acknowledged “in real terms, the likelihood of detonating UXO are far 
lower than that of encountering one”; a sample risk assessment describes it as a “remote 
chance”, that “decay usually results in a device becoming less susceptible to initiation” and “if 
UXO is found, the likelihood of initiating the device and causing an explosion is substantially 
lower” than encountering it. 
Mitigation measures 
Detailed risk assessments usually include a recommendation to complete a penetrative 
ground survey and the employment of a UXO banksman to monitor excavation works.  The 
value of the surveys can be questionable when there is existing “contamination” present, 
perhaps in the form of redundant piled foundations.  CIRIA (2009) acknowledges that the 
clearance certificates provided to clients following UXO site surveys do “not constitute a 
guarantee that the site is clear of UXO” and that “no current UXO detection survey technology 
can provide complete assurance that every buried UXO item has been detected… Even the 
most reasonably practicable method… will leave some level of residual risk”. 
Smith et al. (2014) articulated the experiences of UXO mitigation during Crossrail site 
investigation works.  Significant efforts were made to reduce the number of sites that required 
surveying.  At the time of publication, 81 locations had been subject to risk mitigation measures 
and “no confirmed UXO were recovered or detected at any location.  In two boreholes, ferrous 
objects were detected at depth, and recorded as possible UXO, resulting in the ground 
investigation location being relocated circa 10m away. In one of these positions, it was 
suspected that the object detected was a redundant retaining wall tie, but records were not 
available to confirm this. The nature of the object in the second case remains unknown”.     
The question is raised as to whether the proposed mitigation measures are proportionate; 
given the apparent low discovery rate; the low chance of a UXB detonating and the high cost 
of mitigation works that are sometimes recommended.   
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The risks posed by the mitigation measures themselves must also be acknowledged.  During 
the early investigative works for Crossrail, it was noted that due to the number of penetrative 
UXO surveys that were undertaken “the risk of a utility strike was much increased, and that 
therefore the overall risk faced by the ground investigation works in some cases was 
considered to have actually increased by those UXO mitigation measures” (Smith et al, 2014).  
Placing a UXO banksman near enough an excavation to view the works, exposes an additional 
person to the risks posed by the detonation of a UXB. 
Relative risk 
The CIRIA guide (2009) acknowledged there were no known fatal UXO related incidents on 
construction sites in the UK since the 1940s.  The media sometimes confuse the situation in 
Britain and the Continent.  For instance, the Construction Manager magazine published an 
online article erroneously stating that “over the years, a number of construction workers have 
been killed or injured when excavation equipment has hit unexploded bombs, particularly in 
the UK and Germany”; the statement was later corrected. (Kenny, 2017).  
Loss of life owing to the inadvertent detonation of ordnance in continental Europe has occurred 
and the European situation frequently features in UXO risk assessments.  In January 2016, 
the Smithsonian Magazine (Higginbotham, 2016) reported that 2000t of unexploded munitions 
are discovered on German soil every month and “eleven bomb technicians have been killed 
in Germany since 2000”.  Webster (1996) states that since the French Département du 
Déminage was established in 1946, more than 630 de-miners have been killed.   
The CIRIA guide (2009) note that the scale of German bombing was 20 times lower than the 
Allied bombing of Europe.  The Germans also preferred the use of electrical fuses with a 
limited battery life, rather than the Allied preference for mechanical fuses, which pose a greater 
long term hazard.  A large proportion of Allied bombing took place whilst the Germans were 
retreating and their forces were disorganised; making accurate reporting and disposal of UXO 
less likely.  The WW1 land battles which used huge quantities of ordnance were never 
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replicated in Britain and therefore do not pose a significant threat.  The disparity between the 
discovery rate and casualties makes comparisons between countries difficult, misleading and 
less meaningful. 
The low probability of a fatality due to UXO on construction sites was compared with other 
events that would generally be regarded as low probability, in an effort to draw parallels.  From 
April 2000 to March 2015 the HSE (2015) reported 56 fatalities at work that involved cattle;  
Inquest (2016) state between 1990 and 2015, 24 people died as a result of gunshot by the 
MPS; the Tornado and Storm Research Organisation estimate that an average of 2 people 
die every year in the UK due to lightning strikes (Elsom and Webb, 2014) and an MoD 
statement (2016) reported 134 members of the UK armed forced died in training in the period 
of January 2000 to October 2015 as the training "necessarily involves individuals… taking 
some risks", but they were "as low as reasonably practical" (BBC, 2016).  These apparently 
low probability events still account for between one and eight people dying every year. 
The probability of fatalities following these events could reasonably be perceived as being 
very low, however each of the above examples has resulted in an annual death rate that far 
exceeds the total number of UK construction workers killed by the accidental detonation of 
WW2 UXO in the last 75 years. 
Conclusion  
It is indisputable that the detonation of a HE WW2 bomb on a building site could seriously 
injure or kill numerous people and there is significant evidence that London was heavily 
bombed during WW2.  However, it is not justifiable to link these facts and suggest that UXO 
automatically pose significant risks on construction sites in London.  Risk assessments must 
be completed, however they should be based on a realistic and genuine assessment of the 
probability of UXO discovery, rather than arbitrary or false assumptions of its presence and 
over-inflating the number of UXO that remains undiscovered.   
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The industry should also correct the media when overstating the actual risk that UXO is 
present.  One must question why intrusive mitigation is often recommended and whether the 
proposed measures are proportionate to the risk.  Furthermore, consideration and 
quantification of what constitutes an acceptable risk from UXO to construction workers should 
be made given that it is accepted that the risk cannot be eliminated. 
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